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Foreword
The Union, especially during these di˜   cult times, needs Cohesion Policy. It 
needs a policy that can make the investments that will help the Union and its 
regions emerge from the crisis, reduce disparities, and contribute to meeting 
the ambitious objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
Cohesion Policy has already helped to improve economic, social and environ-
mental conditions within our Union, as shown by our evaluations. However, 
these same evaluations concluded that focussing on a few key priorities, espe-
cially in the more developed regions, would be more e›  ective. Therefore, Cohe-
sion Policy should become more selective. 
Future programmes should concentrate on only a few priorities closely linked 
to the Europe 2020 strategy so that each priority receives enough funding to 
deliver a real impact. These priorities will be identiž  ed in a dialogue between 
the Commission, the Member States and regions, based on a joint assessment 
of the strengths and weaknesses of each Member State and of its regions.
We all share an interest in a Cohesion Policy that brings results. That is why we 
need to agree with the Member States and regions a more limited number of 
objectives per programme and carefully monitor progress. 
In the current programming period, Cohesion Policy has already been closely 
aligned with the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy. The link to the Europe 2020 
strategy must be even stronger in the future. This requires putting in place 
good programmes, with clear conditions and strong incentives. Pre-conditions 
could require, for example, that investment in environmental infrastructure is 
preceded by a transposition of the relevant EU environmental legislation. In-
centives would reward regions and countries that have performed well and 
reached agreed European objectives. 
This report and its proposals has also benež  tted from the past public consulta-
tions. In response to the consultation following the 4th Cohesion Report, we have   Cohesion Report, we have   Cohesion Report
proposed ways to streamline and simplify the delivery mechanisms to reduce 
the administrative burden for benež  ciaries. Following the debate launched by 
the Green Paper on territorial cohesion, this report explains what territorial cohe-
sion adds to Cohesion Policy and presents new indicators that reveal the territo-
rial dimension of issues like poverty and access to services. Consultations with 
stakeholders and Member States’ experts on the future of the Cohesion Policy 
have also highlighted the importance of enhancing the impact and visibility of 
the funds that support it, including for the investments made in human capital 
which are an important element of our new strategy.
The Cohesion Policy proposed for the period after 2013 allows all Member 
States and regions to actively pursue smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
Our e›  orts will in particular support development in the poorest regions in line 
with our commitment to solidarity. But the Commission will also consider the 6
di˜   culties and potential for growth in other parts of the Union, such as urban 
deprived neighbourhoods, regions undergoing economic restructuring and 
more generally the necessary shift to a more innovative and knowledge based 
economy thanks to a better educated workforce. 
The crisis has underlined the continued need for a policy that invests in the 
competitiveness of Europe, the well-being of its citizens and the quality of our 
environment. Yet this policy can only succeed through coordinated action fo-
cused on the key priorities. Only in this way can we promote economic, social 
and territorial cohesion and Europe 2020. 
Johannes Hahn  László Andor
European Commissioner  European Commissioner 
for Regional Policy  for Employment, Social A›  airs and Inclusion
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Summary of the ￿  fth report on 
economic, social and territorial 
cohesion*
The ž  fth Cohesion Report is adopted in the aftermath of the worst ž  nancial and eco-
nomic crisis in recent history. The EU and its Member States responded to this crisis by 
taking measures to keep businesses in operation and people in employment, stimulate 
demand and increase public investment.
Subsequently,  several  governments  have  faced  di˜   culties  rež  nancing  their  debts 
due to a combination of falling revenue and increasing expenditure on welfare pay-
ments and stimulus measures. Faced with large dež  cits and pressure from ž  nancial 
markets, most EU governments are in the process of implementing ž  scal consolidation 
measures.
In the midst of this, the EU has adopted an ambitious new strategy for long-term re-
covery, Europe 2020. Its key objective is smart, inclusive and sustainable growth. Even 
more than its predecessor, the Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020 emphasises the need for 
innovation, employment and social inclusion and a strong response to environmental 
challenges and climate change in order to meet this objective.
The aim of this Cohesion Report is to support the Europe 2020 strategy and highlight 
the contribution that regions, and Cohesion Policy, can make to meet these objectives. 
The report argues that the Europe 2020 headline targets cannot be achieved by poli-
cies formulated at EU or national level alone. Such an ambitious agenda can only suc-
ceed with strong national and regional participation and ownership on the ground. 
This is one of the main lessons learnt from the Lisbon Strategy. For example, reaching 
the employment target of 75% in the Convergence regions would have required al-
most 10 million extra jobs in 2008, more than in all other regions combined.
In addition, the regional diversity in the EU, where regions have vastly di›  erent char-
acteristics, opportunities and needs, requires going beyond ‘one-size-ž  ts-all’ policies 
towards an approach that gives regions the ability to design and the means to deliver 
policies that meet their needs. This is what Cohesion Policy provides through its place-
based approach.
The report argues that an e˜   cient Europe 2020 strategy requires close coordination 
between Cohesion Policy and other EU policies. In many domains, public policies have 
a greater overall impact if they are closely coordinated rather than being implemented 
in isolation. Recent work by the OECD suggests that it is important to combine invest-
ment in transport infrastructure with support for businesses and human capital devel-
opment to achieve sustainable economic and social development.
The ž  fth Cohesion Report is the ž  rst report adopted under the Lisbon Treaty, which 
added territorial cohesion to the twin goals of economic and social cohesion. To cover 
this, the report, ž  rst, analyses the territorial dimension of access to services. Second, it 
pays more attention to climate change and the environment. Third, it considers how 
the territorial impact of policies can be measured.
The report also includes a number of other novelties as compared with earlier reports. 
The analysis of regional economic disparities has been expanded to include issues
*SEC(2010) 1348 ﬁ  nal, 9.11.2010.8
relating to institutions and a new index of competitiveness is presented. Moreover, 
analysis of social cohesion, following the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report, covers both ob-
jective and subjective indicators of well-being and several indicators which have never 
been presented at the regional level before.
The report contains four chapters. The ž  rst focuses on the economic, social and ter-
ritorial situation and trends in the EU by considering how to (1) promote economic 
competitiveness and convergence, (2) improve well-being and reduce social exclusion, 
and (3) enhance environmental sustainability. The second chapter assesses the con-
tribution of national policies to cohesion. The third chapter presents an overview of 
how other EU policies have contributed to cohesion. The last chapter summarises the 
evidence on the positive impact of Cohesion Policy in furthering cohesion objectives 
and highlights the areas where there is room for improvement.
Economic, social and territorial situation and trends
Chapter 1 provides an extensive overview of the situation and trends in EU regions 
from an economic, social and environmental perspective. All three perspectives reveal 
striking regional disparities from di›  erences in productivity, to infant mortality rates 
and vulnerability to climate change. Many of these disparities have shrunk over the 
past decade, some quite quickly, but overall there remains a wide gap between the less 
developed and the highly developed EU regions.
Although some of these regional disparities will never (completely) disappear, many 
of them are ine˜   cient, unfair and unsustainable. To achieve real progress towards the 
goals of smart, green and inclusive growth, these regional disparities have to be re-
duced.
Promoting competitiveness and convergence
The EU is not alone in facing signiž  cant regional development disparities. Many large 
countries such as China, India, Brazil and Russia also have wide di›  erences in regional 
GDP per head and have turned to EU Cohesion Policy to learn how to reduce them.
Di›  erences in GDP per head between the US States are relatively narrow, but the di›  er-
ences within the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), which also includes 
Canada and Mexico, are much larger than those in the EU. These regional disparities in 
NAFTA have not diminished over time. This implies that belonging to a large free trade 
zone alone is not su˜   cient to enable less developed regions to catch up, especially 
when the gap in infrastructure, institutional e˜   ciency and innovation is wide.
The EU’s single market has grown to half a billion people today. Such a large market 
creates new opportunities in terms of economies of scale and specialisation. Both can 
help to make EU ž  rms highly productive and globally more competitive. The value add-
ed of EU ž  rms lies more and more in knowledge-intensive and other services, where 
the EU has a competitive edge as shown by a positive and growing trade balance in 
services with the rest of the world.
The internal market of the EU guarantees free movement not only of goods but also of 
people, services and capital. This allows people to travel more easily for leisure or work. 
The internal market opens up new horizons for investment or retirement and allows 
more people to ž  nd a job and more vacancies to get ž  lled. This increasing integration 
can also be seen in growing trade and ž  nancial ª  ows. Within the EU, trade in goods and 
services has expanded signiž  cantly, especially between countries in the EU-12 and be-
tween the EU-12 and the EU-15. Foreign direct investment and remittances from peo-
ple working in another country have become crucial sources of capital for many of the 
less developed Member States. The crisis, however, has disrupted many of these ª  ows.9
Economic growth per head is linked to changes in population, employment and pro-
ductivity. Since the population grew only slightly in most regions between 2000 and 
2007, it had little e›  ect on regional growth and hardly any e›  ect at EU level. Increases 
in employment had a strong e›  ect in Transition regions and a moderate one in Region-
al Competitiveness and Employment regions. In Convergence regions, employment 
made only a small contribution to growth, but the (very) low employment rates reveal 
a signiž  cantly underutilised resource. The main source of growth in all EU regions was 
higher productivity. Productivity growth was particularly high in Convergence regions 
fuelled by both increases within sectors (linked to innovation in the broad sense) and 
shifts in employment to sectors with a higher value added (restructuring). In Competi-
tiveness regions, higher productivity came almost exclusively from innovation. Pro-
ductivity growth came mostly from innovation in Transition regions, but, true to their 
name, was partly due to restructuring.
Innovation
To become more productive, the EU needs more innovation (in a broad sense) and 
more investment in education, training and life-long learning. Europe 2020 empha-
sises the need for more innovation. For example, only one region in ten has reached 
the Europe 2020 target of investing 3% of GDP in R&D.
Innovation is important for all regions, whether or not they are at the forefront of re-
search. In regions that are not, i.e. most regions, the focus should be more on absorbing 
and spreading innovative practice developed elsewhere, than on radical innovations. 
Accordingly, these regions need to support investment in the capability of ž  rms to in-
ternalise innovative practice and train their work force as well as helping to strengthen 
the links between private enterprise, research centres and government (the triple helix 
model).
The Europe 2020 target of increasing the proportion of those aged 30-34 with a terti-
ary education degree or equivalent to 40% has been reached in less than one in six 
regions and most others will need to increase greatly the capacity of universities and 
the number of young people remaining in education in order to meet this target by 
2020.
The Europe 2020 ‘early-school leaving’ target of at most 10% of young people aged 
18–24 with no education beyond basic schooling has been reached in one in four 
regions, but it will require a substantial e›  ort in many regions to achieve it, especially 
in Malta and the 17 regions in Spain and Portugal where the rate is still above 30%. 
In many cases, public action is necessary to ensure that these economies can exploit 
their assets and opportunities e˜   ciently. Investment in innovation and education can 
boost economic growth markedly, but only if the right infrastructure and institutions 
are in place.
Infrastructure
Innovations lead to more growth if they can easily reach a large market. The infrastruc-
ture needed to reach a large market is changing as more and more services can be 
purchased and distributed online, providing even remote regions with direct access 
to an EU-wide or even global market. Within the EU, this requires establishing a sin-
gle digital market and increasing access to broadband. Broadband access, however, is 
far from universal. In thinly populated areas in Romania, only 13% of households had 
a broadband connection in 2009, compared to Finland where 77% of households in 
thinly populated and 84% in densely populated areas had broadband access.
Despite the growing importance of digital networks, the capacity to move people and 
goods by rail, road, air or water remains critically important. Transport infrastructure, 10
however, is unevenly distributed across the EU. Most central and eastern Member 
States still have considerably fewer motorways than other parts of the EU and much 
lower speeds on their rail network. Access to air transport in most of these countries is 
also poor due to fewer ª  ights and poor connections to airports. 
Border regions often have lower grade transport infrastructure and less access to serv-
ices and markets, especially along the external borders. This tends to reduce their GDP 
per head and employment rates. Cross-border cooperation can enhance welfare, but it 
may involve relatively high transaction costs due to di›  erent institutional systems, cul-
tures and languages. EU support can help overcome such obstacles to bring untapped 
resources into use.
Institutions
Strong institutions are crucial for sustainable economic growth and social welfare. This 
is increasingly recognised by policy-makers and researchers alike. The crisis has high-
lighted the need for stable macroeconomic conditions, but the strategies for recovery 
should balance the need for ž  scal consolidation with the need for su˜   cient levels of 
public investment. Wider availability and use of e-government services can also help 
to increase the transparency and e˜   ciency of public administrations, and cross-border 
and inter-regional cooperation can help to strengthen institutional capacity.
Combined e›  orts to improve infrastructure, institutions and the pace of innovation 
can help the EU’s economy become more productive and more competitive, which is 
key to sustaining adequate rates of growth and creating more and better jobs. To reach 
the Europe 2020 targets, a wide-ranging strategy is essential.
Improving well-being and reducing exclusion
Life expectancy and health
The EU has one of the highest life expectancies in the world. The average age and share 
of the population 65 and over are also among the highest in the world as a result. This 
has consequences for both health services and the labour force. An increase in the 
share of older people implies an increased demand for health and related services. 
As the average age of the labour force increases and people continue in employment 
until later in life, the demand for (re-)training will increase as may the demand for more 
ª  exible working arrangements.
Despite life expectancy being high overall, di›  erences between regions remain rela-
tively wide. The reasons are manifold, ranging from di›  erences in income, education 
and living conditions to uneven access to high quality health care. Infant mortality, for 
example, is substantially higher in Romanian and Bulgarian regions, but also in some 
of the more remote or economically depressed regions in the EU-15. The same is true 
of death rates from cancer and heart disease. Road deaths per head of population dif-
fer by a factor of ten across EU regions, not so much because of the state of the road 
network but because of driver behaviour and the degree of law enforcement.
Living conditions
Unemployment fell substantially between 2000 and 2008. Nevertheless, regional un-
employment rates remained high in Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and Southern 
Spain, even before the crisis. Since 2008, unemployment has risen dramatically in 
many Member States, notably in Spain and the Baltic States, where average rates were 
around 20% by early 2010. Considerable e›  orts will be needed to bring people back 
into employment in the years to come.11
Labour mobility in the EU remains low, especially compared to the US, and this alone 
will not reduce the large regional disparities in unemployment across the EU. Never-
theless, regions with high unemployment have experienced larger outward migration, 
though the pattern of migration di›  ers between the EU-12 and the EU-15. In the EU-
12, migration has tended to be into predominantly urban regions, especially capital 
cities. In the EU-15, there has been more migration to predominantly rural regions than 
predominantly urban ones. Migration from outside the EU was until recently the most 
important source of population growth in EU regions, but the successful integration of 
the people concerned remains uneven and they have considerably lower employment 
rates than average in many Member States.
Within one generation, women have achieved and surpassed the level of education 
attained by men. In virtually all EU regions, many more women aged 25-34 than men 
have a university degree, while for women aged 55-64, this is the case in only a small 
minority of regions. This tendency has not yet led to more equal employment rates. 
In particular in southern European regions, employment rates of women are consid-
erably lower than elsewhere, despite signiž  cant increases over the past decade, and 
unemployment among women is much higher than among men. 
Access to services di›  ers in two main ways, the most important is the di›  erence be-
tween more and less developed countries and the second is the di›  erence between 
thinly and densely populated areas. In most of the more developed Member States 
access to services, such as education, health care or banking, is not a problem in any 
type of area. In the less developed Member States, however, access is more limited, 
especially in thinly populated areas.
Densely populated areas, however, su›  er from a combination of problems in all Mem-
ber States, including from crime, violence, vandalism, pollution and noise. The share 
of population in densely populated areas experiencing these problems is two to three 
times larger than in other areas. Surveys of those living in cities, accordingly, show a 
high level of dissatisfaction with air quality and safety and, in several cases, low levels 
of trust.
Poverty
Europe 2020 aims to reduce poverty and exclusion. The indicator used to monitor this 
combines two absolute indicators (severe material deprivation and living in low work-
intensity households) and a relative one (income below the at-risk-of-poverty thresh-
old).
Severe material deprivation is highly concentrated in the less developed Member 
States and regions where up to a quarter of people are identiž  ed as being severely 
deprived. In the EU-12, the relative number tends to be larger in thinly populated areas, 
while in the EU-15 it is larger in densely populated ones.
Households with low work intensity are most common in the UK, Hungary and Ireland, 
where at least one in 10 lives in such a situation. In the Baltic States, Cyprus and Slova-
kia, by contrast, the number is less than one in 20.
The share of population with an income level that puts them at risk of poverty (less 
than 60% of national median disposable income) also di›  ers markedly between coun-
tries, ranging from one in four (in Romania) to one in 10 (in the Czech Republic). But 
the range is far wider at regional level: from around one in 17 in two Czech regions and 
Trento in Italy to more than one in three in three southern Italian regions, two Span-
ish and one Romanian region. In several Member States, including the UK, Spain, Italy, 
Germany and Poland, the proportion is twice as large in the least prosperous regions 
than in the most prosperous ones.12
Prior to the ž  nancial crisis, household income had increased markedly in many central 
and eastern Member States. This lifted many people out of material deprivation and 
increased their overall life satisfaction and happiness. Unfortunately, the crisis not only 
brought this increase to an end but reversed it. Consequently, it is likely to have in-
creased deprivation, especially in the most a›  ected countries, such as the Baltic States.
Promoting active inclusion and reducing poverty means investing in education, train-
ing and skills, modernising labour markets, training and education systems and social 
and health services to help people anticipate and manage change and to build a co-
hesive society.
Enhancing environmental sustainability
Adapting to climate change
Adapting to climate change will be most di˜   cult in southern cities and regions and 
coastal and mountain areas. Even if greenhouse gas emissions were drastically reduced 
today, temperatures would still increase in the coming years and extreme weather 
events become more frequent, with more droughts, ª  oods and reduced snow cover. 
Several regions which rely heavily on agriculture and winter or summer tourism are 
likely to have more droughts and less snow in the near future which could undermine 
these activities. At the same time, ª  oods are likely to increase in other regions with 
many cities being particularly vulnerable.
Limiting climate change
Reaching the Europe 2020 target of 20% energy consumption from renewables will 
require substantially more investment in solar energy, particularly in southern Europe 
where there is most potential, and in wind energy, especially along the Atlantic and 
North Sea coasts.
The target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% is ambitious and will require 
investment by both the private and the public sector. The private sector will largely be 
covered by the emissions trading scheme, but the public sector will still need to make 
substantial changes and investment to reduce emissions and energy consumption. In-
creasing energy e˜   ciency will require investing in the insulation of buildings, di›  erent 
heating systems, more e˜   cient modes of transport and perhaps promoting urban liv-
ing and more compact cities.
Improving environmental quality
The number of cities where waste water treatment is below EU standards has fallen 
over the past decade. Nevertheless, in several of the eastern Member States, more in-
vestment is still needed to comply fully with the urban waste water directive, which 
is why the accession treaties have foreseen a staggered transition. Though recycling 
of waste has increased and the use of landž  lls diminished, more progress in treating 
waste e˜   ciently is still needed in some southern and eastern Member States.
Air quality is poor in many regions, especially in city centres and in the south, with det-
rimental e›  ects on health and the quality of life. Reducing ozone levels and particulate 
matter in the air will require increased e›  orts at local and regional level. Moreover, 
both the Natura 2000 areas and green infrastructure in the wider countryside need to 
be properly managed and protected.13
National policies and cohesion
National governments have implemented various regional development policies to 
further economic, social and territorial cohesion. While some Member States give pri-
ority to tackling regional disparities, others focus more on national competitiveness or 
on speciž  c territorial features. Irrespective of the approach pursued, the emphasis is 
increasingly on stimulating endogenous development by providing support to areas of  stimulating endogenous development by providing support to areas of  stimulating endogenous development
comparative advantage, rather than compensating regions for disadvantages.
Sub-national governments in virtually all Member States are responsible for a relatively 
large share of public investment. On average, some two-thirds of public investment is 
implemented by regional and local authorities across the EU, underlining the impor-
tance of their contribution to the Europe 2020 strategy.
Public investment is critical to improving the competitiveness of less developed re-
gions, especially in those less well endowed with infrastructure. A number of recent 
studies have concluded that public investment boosts growth under certain condi-
tions, among which good institutional governance is critical. Cohesion Policy support 
ensures that less developed countries and regions can maintain the rates of public in-
vestment required to increase their growth potential and equally helps them strength-
en their institutional capacity.
Cohesion Policy funding means that public investment is higher relative to GDP in Co-
hesion countries than in the rest of the EU. The past decade has seen a positive corre-
lation between rates of public investment and rates of economic growth, suggesting 
both that public investment is important for convergence and that economic growth 
is important for public investment.
Higher rates of public investment in Cohesion countries have mostly gone to improv-
ing infrastructure, notably transport networks, and Cohesion Policy has played a crucial 
role in helping to narrow the gap with more advanced parts of the EU in this respect.
Unlike in the case of their entitlement to EU funding under Cohesion, the relative pros-
perity of regions is not a major determinant of their access to national funds for in-
vestment, except in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in France. Other factors such as 
geophysical features, the extent of ž  scal and political autonomy or the attraction of 
capital cities seem to be at least as important as cohesion objectives in determining 
the regional distribution of public investment.
Cohesion Policy is important for boosting the competitiveness of more advanced re-
gions as well as less developed ones. On average it accounts for around 25% of total 
public investment at regional level in non-Convergence regions in Spain and France. 
It totals around 15% of public expenditure on environmental protection in the West 
Midlands and London and some 25% of public expenditure on improving the adapt-
ability of workers and helping disadvantaged groups ž  nd employment in Central and 
Northern Italy.
The economic crisis led most national governments and some regional authorities to 
introduce ad hoc stimulus packages to mitigate the e›  ects on growth and employ- ad hoc stimulus packages to mitigate the e›  ects on growth and employ- ad hoc
ment. Public investment was a major component of these packages. The legacy of the 
crisis, however, is a dramatic increase in government borrowing and debt. While this 
mostly stems from a fall in tax revenue, restoring macroeconomic stability and reduc-
ing government dež  cits in the coming years to more sustainable levels is likely to put 
pressure on public expenditure programmes and on public investment in particular.
Cohesion Policy, which accounts for a substantial proportion of ž  nancing for invest-
ment in many countries, is therefore likely to become increasingly important in the 
future. On the other hand, ž  scal and budgetary constraints on Member States will have 14
a signiž  cant impact on the environment in which Cohesion Policy operates. This might 
trigger a review of co-ž  nancing rules, which is a fundamental principle of Cohesion 
Policy underpinning the joint approach to EU funding and ensuring ownership of the 
policy on the ground.
The way that the additionality principle is veriž  ed to ensure that Cohesion Policy fund-
ing is used to support investment which is additional to what national governments 
would have otherwise undertaken needs to be revised. Currently, the method used is 
contested on grounds of reliability and lack of comparability between Member States, 
because of its ad hoc nature and complexity. A reform of the system is needed to make  ad hoc nature and complexity. A reform of the system is needed to make  ad hoc
it more reliable, transparent and straightforward.
Structural and institutional reforms are important to maximise the impact of Cohesion 
Policy. However, the pace of reform over the past decade has been relatively slow and 
this has a›  ected the impact of the policy ‘on the ground’. The Europe 2020 strategy has 
set a new framework to which Cohesion Policy needs to adapt. A key aspect of this will 
be to establish closer links between the design and implementation of the policy and 
the macroeconomic objectives and structural and institutional reforms pursued.
Cohesion Policy in the current period includes conditions linked to the macroeconomic 
situation only in respect of the Cohesion Fund (apart from administrative requirements 
on ž  nancial management and control systems). For the next programming period, the 
issue of whether this kind of macroeconomic conditionality should be extended, and 
if so how, should be explored. Other conditions, such as incentives for reform in areas 
closely linked to the operation of Cohesion Policy and which might increase its impact, 
and value for money, might also be worth examining.
Other EU policies and cohesion
According to the EU Treaty, the design and implementation of all EU policies should 
take account of their e›  ect on economic, social and territorial cohesion. Currently 
some policies have a clear territorial dimension, like transport or environment policy. 
Other policies have a partial territorial dimension, such as research, information society 
or health policy. Some policies do not or cannot distinguish in their implementation 
between di›  erent parts of the EU, for example the single market or trade. 
Policies do not need to have a speciž  cally regional thrust to be able to assess their ef-
fect on cohesion. However, it does require having a thorough understanding of the 
local impact of a policy, whether it is spatially targeted or not. Such assessments of the 
territorial impact could be carried out, prior to the approval of a policy, or as part of an 
ex post evaluation. ex post evaluation. ex post
Policies also tend to have inter-dependent e›  ects. Without proper coordination, the 
impact of any one policy is likely to be severely diminished and might even be nega-
tive. The impact of policies cannot therefore be maximised if a fragmented approach is 
adopted and policy decisions are taken in isolation. 
Infrastructure improvements, for example, do not lead automatically to higher growth 
and, in fact, might even result in a net reduction in economic activity in less developed 
regions (‘leaking by linking’). Investment in infrastructure needs to be combined with 
investment in education, enterprise, and innovation to ensure not only that it has a 
positive e›  ect on development but that this e›  ect is maximised by taking account of 
the complementary e›  ects of this other investment. 
Similarly, innovation may be spatially concentrated, but its benež  ts are not. Investment 
in R&D and businesses therefore needs to be complemented by investment in human 
capital, not only to foster the e˜   ciency of the regional innovation process, but also to 
ensure that the benež  ts of innovation are distributed widely in spatial and social terms.15
As regards R&D and innovation, Cohesion Policy needs to complement the activities 
carried out under the Research Framework Programme and the Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework Programme. This can be achieved by focusing the role of Cohe-
sion Policy on spreading and applying examples of innovative practice across the EU 
at regional level (‘smart specialisation’) and on supporting investment in basic infra-
structure, institutions and human resources in less developed regions so that they can 
participate fully in the knowledge economy.
Given the tightening budget constraints which will limit public expenditure over the 
next few years across the EU and the parallel need to support economic recovery, these 
limited public resources should be used to maximum e›  ect, which, as the Europe 2020 
strategy makes clear, can only happen if all EU policies are mutually reinforcing.
The impact of Cohesion Policy
Cohesion Policy is the EU’s main instrument for pursuing harmonious development 
across the Union. It is based on a broad vision, which encompasses not just the eco-
nomic development of lagging regions and support for vulnerable social groups, but 
also environmental sustainability and respect for the territorial and cultural features 
of di›  erent parts of the EU. This breadth of vision is reª  ected in the variety of pro-
grammes, projects and partners that are supported under the policy.
In terms of the regional economy, the funding provided by Cohesion Policy over the 
period 2000-2006 created some 1 million jobs in enterprises across the EU, as well as 
perhaps adding as much as 10% to GDP in Objective 1 regions in the EU-15. As vari-
ous studies indicate, this tended to boost the trade and exports of net contributor 
countries, which helps to o›  set their contribution to funding the policy. Accordingly, 
macroeconomic model simulations indicate that Cohesion Policy had the net e›  ect of 
raising the level of GDP in the EU as a whole.
Nevertheless, there is room for improvement: grants to enterprise provide valuable 
support, but too often in the past there has been an over-reliance on them. The trend 
towards a more balanced mix, including ž  nancial engineering (loans and venture capi-
tal) as well as more indirect measures, such as advice and guidance and support for 
networking and clustering, is a welcome one. The European Commission, in close part-
nership with the EIB, is actively encouraging such diversiž  cation of support measures 
through initiatives such as JEREMIE, JASMINE, JASPERS and JESSICA.
In addition, Cohesion Policy investment in motorways and roads in the less developed 
parts of the EU-15 over many years means that the job is now largely done. Investment 
should shift towards more environmentally-friendly modes of transport (notably rail 
and urban transport systems), though in the EU-12 the need to improve all transport 
links remains a priority.
Cohesion Policy also supports the training of around 10 million people a year, with 
a  strong  focus  on  young  people,  the  long-term  unemployed  and  the  low  skilled. 
Through  various  local  development  initiatives,  Cohesion  Policy  has  a  strong  track 
record of cross-border co-operation, regenerating deprived urban neighbourhoods, 
and improving access to services in rural areas.
Involving regional and local communities can improve policies. Evaluation evidence 
has demonstrated that the active participation of people and organisations in projects 
at regional and local level, from the design to the implementation stage, is a crucial 
success factor. Indeed, such partnership is one of the key sources of added-value of 
Cohesion Policy, mobilising the skills and knowledge of those concerned to make pro-
grammes more e›  ective and inclusive.16
In terms of protecting the environment, more than half the Member States are tracking 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as a target in their Cohesion Policy pro-
grammes for the 2007-2013 period.
More than 23 million people were connected to wastewater collection and treatment 
systems and at least 20 million people connected to clean supply of drinking water 
through ERDF and Cohesion Fund support in 2000-2006. As a result, Cohesion Policy 
has helped many regions to meet the requirements of EU environmental Directives 
and by so doing has helped to protect the environment and to improve the quality of 
life. However, the sustainability of the facilities constructed needs more careful consid-
eration to ensure that investment in environmental infrastructure is made with clear 
plans for long-term ž  nancing.
In terms of policy management, strong and sound administration at national, regional 
and local levels is important for the success and lasting e›  ect of Cohesion Policy. Evalu-
ations have found that the EU-12 countries have signiž  cantly improved administrative 
capacity since accession. Nevertheless, continued e›  orts are needed to ensure that 
all government levels in the EU have the necessary administrative capacity to deliver 
Cohesion Policy e›  ectively.
A recurrent evaluation ž  nding across all areas of investment was a preoccupation 
with ‘absorption’, i.e., with spending the money more than focusing on what the pro-
grammes were actually designed to achieve. While the former is obviously a precondi-
tion for success, the latter is ultimately what matters. For example, monitoring systems 
typically prioritise spending and outputs (such as the number of people trained or kilo-
metres of new roads constructed) rather than results (such as the number of people 
getting a job after training or the amount of journey time saved) let alone impacts (the 
e›  ect of a better trained work force or more e˜   cient transport networks on regional 
development).
Cohesion Policy needs to cultivate a focus on performance. This has to start from pro-
grammes identifying a limited number of policy priorities (concentration) with a clear 
view of how they will be achieved and how their achievement will contribute to the 
economic, social and territorial development of the regions, or Member States, con-
cerned.
Monitoring and evaluation systems need to be improved across the EU to track per-
formance and to help redirect e›  orts as necessary to ensure that objectives are at-
tained. This requires a clear strategic vision of what the programme aims to achieve 
and how success will be recognised and measured (proper target setting). It also re-
quires a strong and reliable monitoring system, as well as greater recourse to rigorous 
evaluation methods, including counterfactual impact evaluation, cost benež  t analysis, 
benež  ciary surveys, as well as a more rigorous use of qualitative methods such as case 
studies.17
Introduction
Europe faces a daunting task. It must exit from a deep crisis and reduce unemploy-
ment and poverty, while switching to a low-carbon economy. Such an ambitious task 
requires swift action on many fronts, which is why the European Council adopted the 
Europe 2020 Strategy1. For Europe to succeed, European, national, regional and local 
levels all need to play their part. Cohesion Policy should continue to play a critical role 
in these di˜   cult times, in order to deliver smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 
while promoting harmonious development of the Union and its regions by reducing 
regional disparities.
Cohesion Policy has made a signiž  cant contribution to spreading growth and pros-
perity across the Union, while reducing economic, social and territorial disparities. The 
ž  fth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion shows that the policy has cre-
ated new jobs, increased human capital, built critical infrastructure and improved envi-
ronmental protection, especially in the less developed regions. Undoubtedly, without 
Cohesion Policy, disparities would be greater. Yet the lasting social e›  ects of the crisis, 
the demand for innovation arising from increased global challenges and the impera-
tive to make the most of every euro of public expenditure call for an ambitious reform 
of the policy.
As indicated in the EU budget review2, in particular progress needs to be made in the 
following key areas: concentrating resources on the Europe 2020 objectives and tar-
gets; committing Member States to implementing the reforms needed for the policy 
to be e›  ective; and improving the e›  ectiveness of the policy with an increased focus 
on results. The explicit linkage of Cohesion Policy and Europe 2020 provides a real op-
portunity: to continue helping the poorer regions of the EU catch up, to facilitate coor-
dination between EU policies, and to develop Cohesion Policy into a leading enabler 
of growth, also in qualitative terms, for the whole of the EU, while addressing societal 
challenges such as ageing and climate change.
With these conclusions, the Commission opens a public consultation on the future of Cohe-
sion Policy. This is organised around a series of questions on the main ideas for its reform.
The following sections look, in turn, at how the policy can be made more e›  ective and 
its impact improved so as to enhance the European added value (Section 2), at how 
governance of the policy can be further strengthened (Section 3), at how the delivery 
system can be streamlined and made simpler (Section 4) and at the architecture of the 
policy (Section 5).
*   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, COM(2010) 642 ﬁ  nal, 
9.11.2010.
1   ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ - COM(2010) 2020, 3.3.2010.
2   ‘The EU budget review’ - COM(2010) 700, 19.10.2010.
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Enhancing the European added value of Cohesion Policy
The added value of Cohesion Policy is recurrently debated by policy-makers, academ-
ics and stakeholders. Some argue that Cohesion Policy is loosely linked to EU priori-
ties, that it spreads resources too thinly across policy areas and that its impact is often 
di˜   cult to measure. Though the report shows that Cohesion Policy has contributed 
to economic and social development of regions and to the well-being of people, the 
Commission takes these criticisms very seriously.
Further reforms of Cohesion Policy, while preserving its overall objective, should therefore 
aim to steer the policy decisively towards results and enact the reforms needed in order to 
achieve results, while cutting red-tape and simplifying the daily management of the policy.
Reinforcing strategic programming
Cohesion Policy has already been substantially aligned with the Lisbon Strategy, in 
particular by earmarking ž  nancial resources. However, this alignment is not su˜   cient 
due to a governance gap between the two strategic processes. More can be done in 
the future to further alignment of Cohesion Policy with the Europe 2020 Strategy. This 
requires, ž  rst of all, clear guidance at European level and a more strategic negotiating 
process and follow-up.
The EU budget review outlined a new strategic programming approach for Cohesion 
Policy with a view to closer integration of EU policies to deliver the Europe 2020 Strat-
egy and the Integrated Guidelines. This approach would consist of: 
•    a common strategic framework (CSF) adopted by the Commission translating the   common strategic framework (CSF) adopted by the Commission translating the   common strategic framework
targets and objectives of Europe 2020 into investment priorities. The framework 
would cover the Cohesion Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and 
the European Fisheries Fund; 
•    a development and investment partnership contract which, based on the com-
mon strategic framework, would set out the investment priorities, the allocation 
of national and EU resources between priority areas and programmes, the agreed 
conditionalities, and the targets to be achieved. This contract would cover Cohe-
sion Policy. In order to promote economic, social and territorial cohesion in a coher-
ent and integrated manner, it might be useful to extend its scope to other policies 
and EU funding instruments. The contract will be the fruit of the discussions be-
tween Member States and the Commission on the development strategy present-
ed in their National Reform Programmes. It would also describe the coordination 
between EU funds at national level; and 
•    operational programmes (OPs) which, as in the current period, would be the main 
management tool and would translate the strategic documents into concrete in-
vestment priorities accompanied by clear and measurable targets — which should 
contribute to reach the national targets set in the framework of Europe 2020. 
The timing of the annual reports monitoring progress towards the targets would be 
aligned with the Europe 2020 governance cycle. On this basis, a regular political de-
bate in the relevant Council formations and European Parliament committees would 
improve transparency, accountability and assessment of the e›  ects of Cohesion Policy. 
Three proposals in the EU budget review have a particular impact on Cohesion Policy: 
concentrating ž  nancial resources, the system of conditionality and incentives, and fo-
cus on results.19
Increasing thematic concentration
The ex post evaluations of Cohesion Policy concluded that greater concentration of 
resources is required to build up a critical mass and make a tangible impact.
In the future it will therefore be necessary to ensure that Member States and regions 
concentrate EU and national resources on a small number of priorities responding to 
the speciž  c challenges that they face. This could be achieved by establishing, in the Co-
hesion Policy regulations, a list of thematic priorities linked to the priorities, Integrated 
Guidelines and ª  agship initiatives of Europe 2020. 
Depending on the amount of EU funding involved, countries and regions would be 
required to focus on more or fewer priorities. Thus, Member States and regions receiv-
ing less funding would be required to allocate the entire ž  nancial allocation available 
to two or three priorities, whereas those receiving more ž  nancial support may select 
more. Certain priorities would be obligatory. 
At the same time, thematic concentration should not prevent Member States and re-
gions to experiment and fund innovative projects. Ring-fencing expenditure for spe-
ciž  c target groups or experimental approaches (e.g. local development) might also be 
considered, possibly in the form of global grants. 
Strengthening performance through conditionality and incentives 
The ž  nancial and economic crisis has already compelled the Commission to propose 
measures to improve the economic governance of the Union3. Sound macroeconomic 
policies, a favourable microeconomic environment and strong institutional frame-
works are preconditions for creating jobs, stimulating growth, reducing social exclu-
sion and bringing about structural changes. 
This is even truer of Cohesion Policy, since its e›  ectiveness largely depends on the eco-
nomic environment in which it operates. It is therefore possible to strengthen the links 
between Cohesion Policy and the economic policy framework of the Union.
First, to support the new economic governance system new conditionality provisions 
would be introduced creating incentives for reforms. Member States would be re-
quired to introduce the reforms needed to ensure e›  ective use of ž  nancial resources 
in the areas directly linked to Cohesion Policy, for example environmental protection, 
ª  exicurity policies, education or research and innovation. 
For each thematic priority the CSF would establish the key principles which interven-
tions should follow. These principles must leave room for adaptation to national and 
regional contexts. Their main purpose would be to help countries and regions to tackle 
the problems that past experience has shown to be particularly relevant to policy im-
plementation. These principles could be linked to, for example, transposition of spe-
ciž  c EU legislation, the ž  nancing of strategic EU projects, or administrative, evaluation 
and institutional capacity. 
On this basis, speciž  c binding conditionality in the areas directly linked to Cohesion 
Policy would be agreed with each Member State and/or region — depending on the 
institutional context — at the beginning of the programming cycle in the program-
ming documents (i.e. the development and investment partnership contracts and 
3   ‘Enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs — Tools for stronger EU economic 
governance’ - COM(2010) 367.20
the operational programmes), in a coordinated approach with all relevant EU policies. 
Their fulž  lment could be a prerequisite for disbursing cohesion resources either at the 
beginning of the programming period or during a review in which the Commission 
would assess progress towards completing agreed reforms.
Achievement of institutional reform is critical to underpin structural adjustment, fos-
ter growth and jobs and reduce social exclusion, notably by reducing regulatory and 
administrative burdens on businesses or by improving public services. As now, these 
would be complemented by support under Cohesion Policy to develop administrative 
and institutional capacity and e›  ective governance. This should be available to every 
Member State and region. 
Second, ž  nancial sanctions and incentives linked to the Stability and Growth Pact have 
been so far limited to the Cohesion Fund. The Commission has proposed to extend it 
to the rest of the EU budget as complementary leverage to ensure the respect of key 
macroeconomic conditions in the context of the corrective arm of the Pact. In cases of 
non-compliance with the rules of the Pact, incentives should be created by suspend-
ing or cancelling part of current or future appropriations from the EU budget without 
a›  ecting end-benež  ciaries of EU funds. Resources cancelled would remain within the 
EU budget.
Still in the context of the wider economic governance of the EU, the veriž  cation of the 
principle of additionality should be reformed by linking it to the EU economic sur-
veillance process, using indicators already provided in the Stability and Convergence 
Programmes which Member States submit to the Commission every year. 
Co-￿  nancing is one of the fundamental principles of Cohesion Policy ensuring owner-
ship of the policy on the ground. Its level should be reviewed and, possibly, di›  erenti-
ated to reª  ect better the level of development, EU added value, types of action and 
benež  ciaries.
Finally, other instruments which could further strengthen the e›  ectiveness of Cohe-
sion Policy also need to be explored. For example, a performance reserve could be 
established at EU level to encourage progress towards Europe 2020 targets and related 
national targets and objectives: a limited share of the cohesion budget would be set 
aside and be allocated, during a mid-term review, to the Member States and regions 
whose programmes have contributed most – compared to their starting point – to 
the 2020 targets and objectives. Also, the experience gained over the current period 
has demonstrated that the Commission needs some resources to support directly ex-
perimentation and networking, along the lines of the innovative actions of previous 
programming periods.
Improving evaluation, performance and results
Higher-quality, better-functioning monitoring and evaluation systems are crucial for 
moving towards a more strategic and results-oriented approach to Cohesion Policy. A 
number of changes would support this shift.
First, the starting point for a results-oriented approach is ex ante setting of clear and 
measurable targets and outcome indicators. Indicators must be clearly interpreta-
ble, statistically validated, truly responsive and directly linked to policy intervention, 
and promptly collected and publicised. Indicators and targets should be agreed in 
the discussions on the programming documents in addition to a few core Fund-
speciž  c indicators for all operational programmes linked to the Europe 2020 frame-
work. Moreover, timely and complete submission of accurate information on the
indicators and on the progress towards the agreed targets would be central to the 
annual reports.21
Second, ex anteevaluations should focus on improving programme design so that the 
tools and incentives for achieving objectives and targets can be monitored and evalu-
ated during implementation. 
Third, evaluation should make much greater use of rigorous methods in line with in-
ternational standards, including impact evaluation. Whenever possible, impact evalu-
ations would be designed at an early stage to ensure collection and dissemination of 
the appropriate data. Moreover, plans for on-going evaluation of each programme 
would  become  an  obligation,  since  they  facilitate  transparency  at  EU  level,  foster 
evaluation  strategies  and  improve  the  overall  quality  of  evaluations.  Evaluations 
could also be envisaged once a certain amount of the funds has been certiž  ed to the 
Commission. 
Finally, Member States could prepare a report synthesising results of on-going evalu-
ations they conduct during the programming period with a view to giving a compre-
hensive summative evaluation of programme performance.
Supporting use of new ￿  nancial instruments
The EU budget review makes a strong case for increasing the leverage e›  ect of the EU 
budget. New forms of ž  nance for investment have been developed in the 2007-2013 
programming period, moving away from traditional grant-based ž  nancing towards 
innovative ways of combining grants and loans. The Commission would like Member 
States and regions to make a more extended use of such instruments in the future.
Financial instruments help to create revolving forms of ž  nance, making them more sus-
tainable over the longer term. This is also one way of helping Europe to increase resources 
for investment, especially in times of recession. It opens new markets to di›  erent forms of 
public-private partnership, bringing in the expertise of international ž  nancial institutions.
To improve ž  nancial engineering instruments within Cohesion Policy, a number of 
measures could be examined:
•    provide greater clarity and di“  erentiation between rules governing grant-based 
ž  nancing and rules governing repayable forms of assistance in the regulatory 
framework, especially on eligibility of expenditure and audits;
•    channel generic ￿  nancial support to ￿  rms mainly via ž  nancial engineering instru-
ments and use grants to co-ž  nance targeted support schemes (innovation, envi-
ronmental investments, etc.);
•  extend both the scope and scale of ￿  nancial engineering instruments: in terms 
of scope, to encompass new activities (e.g. sustainable urban transport, research 
and development, energy, local development, lifelong learning or mobility actions, 
climate change and environment, ICT and broadband); in terms of scale, to com-
bine interest subsidies with loan capital or other forms of repayable ž  nancing.
•      How could the Europe 2020 Strategy and Cohesion Policy be brought closer 
together at EU, national and sub-national levels?
•    Should the scope of the development and investment partnership contract go 
beyond Cohesion Policy and, if so, what should it be? 
•    How could stronger thematic concentration on the Europe 2020 priorities be 
achieved? 
•        How  could  conditionalities,  incentives  and  results-based  management  make 
Cohesion Policy more e›  ective? 
•    How could Cohesion Policy be made more results-oriented? Which priorities 
should be obligatory?22
Strengthening governance
Introducing a third dimension: territorial cohesion
The Lisbon Treaty has added territorial cohesion to the goals of economic and social 
cohesion. As a result, it is necessary to address this objective in the new programmes, 
with particular emphasis on the role of cities, functional geographies, areas facing spe-
ciž  c geographical or demographic problems and macro-regional strategies.
Urban areas can be the engines of growth and hubs for creativity and innovation. 
Higher growth levels and new jobs can be created provided a critical mass of actors 
like companies, universities and researchers is established. Urban problems, whether 
related to environmental degradation or to social exclusion, call for a speciž  c response 
and for direct involvement of the level of government concerned. Accordingly, an am-
bitious urban agenda should be developed where ž  nancial resources are identiž  ed 
more clearly to address urban issues and urban authorities would play a stronger role 
in designing and implementing urban development strategies. Urban action, the re-
lated resources and the cities concerned should be clearly identiž  ed in the program-
ming documents.
For the future, one aspect which should be examined is whether the regulatory archi-
tecture of Cohesion Policy should allow greater ”  exibility in organising operational 
programmes in order to reª  ect the nature and geography of development processes 
better. Programmes could then be designed and managed not only at national and 
regional levels, but also — for example — at the level of groups of towns or of river 
and sea basins.
The report has shown that in some cases geographical or demographic features
could intensify development problems. This is particularly true of the outermost re-
gions but also of northernmost regions with very low population density and island, 
cross-border and mountain regions, as explicitly recognised by the Lisbon Treaty. It will 
be necessary to develop targeted provisions to reª  ect these speciž  cities, without un-
necessarily multiplying instruments and programmes. Territorial cohesion also means 
addressing urban-rural linkages in terms of access to a›  ordable and quality infra-
structures and services, and problems in regions with a high concentration of socially 
marginalised communities.
Finally, further work on new macro-regional strategies should be based on a thor-
ough review of existing strategies and the availability of resources. Macro-regional stra-
tegies should be broad-based integrated instruments focused on key challenges and 
supported by a reinforced trans-national strand, although the bulk of funding should 
come from the national and regional programmes co-ž  nanced by Cohesion Policy and 
from other national resources.
Reinforcing partnership
E›  ective implementation of Europe 2020 requires a governance system that involves 
the actors of change in Member States and that links the EU, national, regional and lo-
cal levels of administration. 
In  order  to  mobilise  fully  all  involved,  representation  of  local  and  regional  stake-
holders, social partners and civil society in both the policy dialogue and implemen-
tation of Cohesion Policy should be strengthened. With this in mind, support for the 
dialogue between public and private entities, including socio-economic partners and 
non-governmental organisations, should be maintained.23
In this context, the role of local development approaches  In this context, the role of local development approaches  In this context, the role of under Cohesion Policy 
should be reinforced, for example by supporting active inclusion, fostering social in-
novation, developing innovation strategies or designing schemes for regeneration of 
deprived areas. These should be closely coordinated with similar actions supported 
under rural development and maritime policies.
•    How can Cohesion Policy take better account of the key role of urban areas and of 
territories with particular geographical features in development processes and of 
the emergence of macro-regional strategies?
•    How  can  the  partnership  principle  and  involvement  of  local  and  regional 
stakeholders, social partners and civil society be improved? 
A streamlined and simpler delivery system
Although it is too early to draw ž  nal conclusions on the e›  ectiveness of the delivery 
system of Cohesion Policy in the period 2007-2013, Member States have argued against 
too frequent and drastic amendments of the rules that could hamper implementation. 
Nevertheless, a number of targeted changes deserve to be examined.
Financial management
In line with the recent proposal for revision of the Financial Regulation4, each year 
the authority responsible for managing Cohesion Policy programmes would present 
a management declaration accompanied by the annual accounts and an independ-
ent audit opinion. This would strengthen the line of accountability for expenditure co-
ž  nanced by the EU budget in any given ž  nancial year. 
On the basis of the annual management declaration, the Commission proposes to in-
troduce a periodical clearance of accounts procedure for Cohesion Policy. This would 
reinforce the assurance process and also allow regular partial closure of programmes. 
The Commission has to consider whether not reimbursing national authorities until 
the corresponding EU contribution has been paid to benež  ciaries would speed up pay-
ments of grants to benež  ciaries and increase the incentive for strong national control.
Also, the Commission will examine the possibility of introducing output- or results-
based elements for disbursement of the EU contribution to operational programmes 
or parts of programmes, depending on the type of action.
Finally, simpliž  ed methods of reimbursement, such as the standard scale of unit costs 
and lump-sum payments for grants introduced for 2007-2013, should be further pro-
moted, thus increasing their impact. This would be another way of moving towards a 
more results-based approach.
Reducing the administrative burden
The general approach for 2007-2013, under which eligibility rules are set at national 
level, should be retained. However, common rules should be adopted on key points 
such as overheads covering di›  erent EU Funds. Alignment of rules on eligibility of ex-
penditures across policy areas, ž  nancial instruments and funds would simplify use of 
funds by benež  ciaries and management of funds by national authorities, reducing the 
4   ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Financial Regulation applicable to 
the general budget of the European Union’ - COM(2010) 260.24
risk of errors while providing for di›  erentiation where needed to reª  ect the speciž  ci-
ties of the policy, the instrument and the benež  ciaries.
In  line  with  the  proportionality  principle,  it  would  also  be  useful  to  examine  how 
control measures could be made more cost-e›  ective and risk-based to improve their 
e›  ectiveness and e˜   ciency while ensuring adequate coverage of the inherent risks at 
a reasonable cost, in accordance with the principle of sound ž  nancial management.
Financial discipline
The de-commitment rule aims to ensure that projects are implemented within a 
reasonable timeframe and to encourage ž  nancial discipline. However, it can distort 
the behaviour of Member States and regions by concentrating too much attention 
on quick, and less on e›  ective, use of resources. Furthermore, application of the de-
commitment rule has been complicated by a number of derogations. There is a need 
to strike a careful balance between ensuring the quality of investment and smooth 
and rapid implementation. One possibility would be to apply N+2 with the exception 
of the ž  rst year to all programmes and remove exemptions and derogations.
Financial control
With regard to management and control systems, there is a need not only to deliver 
stronger assurance but also to achieve greater commitment, on the part of Member 
States, to quality control. This would allow the European Parliament, the Commission 
and Member States to focus more on the results and impact of the policy. 
The ž  rst proposal is to review the procedure for ex ante assessment of the systems, tak-
ing account of the experience gained from the ex ante compliance assessment for 2007-
2013 programmes in order to prevent problems in management and control systems. 
The procedure should be streamlined whilst retaining its benež  ts. This can be achieved 
by targeting the assessment on the main management body responsible by means of 
an accreditation process and by reviewing the Commission’s involvement in this process.
The second proposal is to reinforce assurance by concentrating responsibilities. An ac-
credited body would assume sole responsibility for proper management and control 
of the operational programme. 
•    How can the audit process be simpliž  ed and how can audits by Member States 
and the Commission be better integrated, whilst maintaining a high level of 
assurance on expenditure co-ž  nanced?
•    How could application of the proportionality principle alleviate the administrative 
burden  in  terms  of  management  and  control?  Should  there  be  speciž  c 
simpliž  cation measures for territorial cooperation programmes?
•    How can the right balance be struck between common rules for all the Funds and 
acknowledgement of Funds’ speciž  cities when dež  ning eligibility rules?
•    How can ž  nancial discipline be ensured, while providing enough ª  exibility to 
design and implement complex programmes and projects?
The architecture of Cohesion Policy 
Cohesion Policy aims to promote harmonious development of the Union and its re-
gions by reducing regional disparities (Article 174 of the Treaty). It also underpins the 
growth model of the Europe 2020 strategy including the need to respond to societal 
and employment challenges all Member States and regions face. The policy supports 25
such development with a clear investment strategy in every region by increasing com-
petitiveness, expanding employment, improving social inclusion and protecting and 
enhancing the environment. The multilevel governance system for the policy helps to 
make the EU more visible to its citizens.
All regions and Member States would be eligible to Cohesion Policy and able to tailor 
their strategy in an integrated manner to their speciž  c strengths and weaknesses.
As today, support would be di›  erentiated between regions based on their level of 
economic development (measured by GDP per capita), drawing a clear distinction be-
tween ‘less’ and ‘more’ developed regions. To soften the transition between these two 
categories and ensure a fairer treatment for regions with similar levels of economic 
development, the question could be asked as to whether a simpler system with a new 
intermediate category of regions could replace the current phasing-out and phasing-
in system. This category would also include regions currently eligible under the ‘con-
vergence’ objective but whose GDP would be higher than 75% of the Union average 
according to the latest statistics. 
At the same time, and consistently with the EU budget review, there is a need to con-
sider for the future architecture of Cohesion Policy, how the ESF could be refocused 
on securing the 2020 targets and objectives and how to achieve greater visibility and 
predictable funding volumes. It is also important to examine how the Fund could bet-
ter serve the European employment strategy and contribute to the comprehensive 
European employment initiative called for by the EU budget review.
The policy will continue to focus on implementing the Integrated Guidelines for eco-
nomic and employment policies.
The Cohesion Fund would continue to benež  t Member States whose GNI per capita is 
lower than 90% of the Union average.
Finally, Cohesion Policy would continue to foster territorial dimensions of cooper-
ation (cross-border, transnational and inter-regional). This would include a review and 
simpliž  cation of the current arrangements for cross-border cooperation, including IPA, 
ENPI and EDF cross-border cooperation at the EU’s external borders, and also of current 
practices in transnational action supported both by the ERDF and the ESF.
•    How can it be ensured that the architecture of Cohesion Policy takes into account 
the speciž  city of each Fund and in particular the need to provide greater visibility 
and predictable funding volumes for the ESF and to focus it on securing the 2020 
objectives?
•    How could a new intermediate category of regions be designed to accompany 
regions which have not completed their process of catching up? 26
Next steps
The ž  fth Cohesion Report sets out some of the Commission’s key ideas for the reform 
of Cohesion Policy following a long discussion which started with the fourth Cohesion 
Report in 2007. These will be ž  ne-tuned and consolidated in the next few months.
The  Commission  invites  all  stakeholders  to  give  their  responses  to  the  questions 
presented in this Communication. Comments can be posted until 31 January 2011 on: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/index_en.htm
Due account will be taken of the responses received when drafting the legislative 
proposals to be presented immediately after the adoption of the new Multi Annual 
Financial Framework in 2011.
The ž  fth Cohesion Forum which will take place in Brussels on 31 January and 1 Febru-



















Index, EU-27 = 100
GDP per head (PPS), 2007
Source: Eurostat




Gross Domestic Product per head in Purchasing Power Standards.
Why does this matter?
Gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  is  the  total  value  of  all 
goods and services produced within a region in a given 
period of time. GDP per head is the level of output per in-
habitant which is an indication of the average level of eco-
nomic wealth generated per person. In order to compare 
regions,  it  is  computed  in  Purchasing  Power  Standards 
(PPS) which eliminates di›  erences in purchasing power 
due to di›  erent price levels.
In general, the level of GDP per head is closely related to 
global economic performance, in particular to productiv-
ity and employment. Its change over time indicates the 
pace of economic development.
How do the EU regions score?
The geographical distribution of GDP per head underlines large development gaps between EU regions and par-
ticularly between the Western and the Central and Eastern Member States. The top ten regions are all located in the 
West and are often capital city regions. At the other end of the spectrum, several regions in Bulgaria and Romania 
have levels of GDP per head below 30% of the EU-27 average. The lowest level is 26% in Severozapaden, Bulgaria.
Growth of real GDP per head has been particularly high in 
the Baltic States as well as in regions hosting the national 
capital or a large city, although the crisis has disrupted 
this  process.  Strong  upward  trends  are  also  frequently 
observed in regions with a low level of GDP per head, like 
for instance Vest, Romania whose GDP per head increased 
from 27% of the EU-27 average in 2000 to 48% in 2007. 
On  the  other  hand,  modest  changes  in  GDP  per  head 
are observed in regions where its level is already high, 
particularly in Northern Italy or in France. For example, 
Provincia Autonoma Trento where GDP per head is 118% 
of the EU-27 average experienced a negative growth rate 
(-0.14%) between 2000 and 2007.
On  average,  Convergence  and  Transition  regions  have 
grown faster than RCE regions. This suggests that high 
growth poor regions are catching up with the rest of the EU and is consistent with the fact that convergence among EU 
regions in terms of GDP/head has increased.
Country Top Ten regions 
GDP per head in 
PPS EU-27=100
This table shows the ten regions with the highest GDP 
per head in PPS in 2007
UK Inner London* 334.2
LU Luxembourg (Grand-Duché)* 275.2





FR Île de France 168.8




* These ž  gures are distorted by commuting
Country Top Ten Movers annual average % 
real change
This table shows the ten regions with the biggest increase 







SK Západné Slovensko 7.5
RO Sud - Muntenia 7.2
RO Bucureşti - Ilfov 6.9
SK Bratislavský kraj 6.7
Convergence Transition RCE
GDP per head in PPS EU-27=100 60 94 121
Growth rate in real GDP per head, 2000-2007



























% of population aged 30-34
Population aged 30-34 with a tertiary education in 2008 and distance to Europe 2020 
target
The Europe 2020 target for the share of 
population aged 30-34 with tertiary education 
is 40%
EU-27 = 31.1
ISCED levels 5 and 6
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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Population aged 30-34 with tertiary education 
and the Europe 2020 strategy
Proportion of population aged 30-34 with tertiary education to the total population 30-34.
Why does this matter?
Education levels are one of the most important factors of economic growth, especially the share of working-age 
population with tertiary education. People with tertiary education are more likely to get a job, have a higher income 
and have higher life expectancy. Most of the increase in the share of the tertiary-educated working-age population 
comes from those under 35. Therefore, the Europe 2020 strategy has set the target for the share of population aged 
30-34 with tertiary education at 40%.
How do the EU regions score?
The Competitiveness regions have the highest share of 
tertiary-educated 30-34 year olds and have experienced 
the highest increase in 2000-2008 which will have a posi-
tive impact on their future productivity and competitive-
ness.  The  share  increased  signiž  cantly  also  in  Conver-
gence regions, however, with less than 25% they still lag 
signiž  cantly behind the Europe 2020 target. The top ten 
regions  all  have  shares  above  the  Europe  2020  target. 
Most of them are capital city regions or adjoin capital city 
regions which is not only a result of universities being lo-
cated there but also people moving there after complet-
ing their education.
The increase of the share of tertiary-educated 30-34 
year olds in the top ten movers is impressive but the 
e›  ect would be even higher if accompanied by an in-
crease in the employment rates. Increasing employ-
ment rates at the same time as education levels is likely 
to mean that the additional jobs created have higher 
productivity  than  the  current  ones.  Increasing  the 
share of tertiary-educated 30-34 year olds in regions 
with very low shares, would also contribute to better 
local institutions.
Country Top Ten regions Tertiary 
education %
This table shows the ten regions with the highest rate 
of population aged 30-34 with tertiary education in 2008
DK Hovedstaden 58.6
ES País Vasco 58.3
UK Inner London 57.1
BE Prov. Brabant Wallon 57.0
UK North Eastern Scotland 55.0
NL Utrecht 54.9
BE Prov. Vlaams-Brabant 53.7
SE Stockholm 51.8
ES Comunidad de Madrid 50.6
FR Île de France 50.1
Country Top Ten Movers
Change in tertiary 
education, 
percentage points
This table shows the ten regions in which the share of tertiary 
educated population (age 30-34) increased fastest 




IE Border, Midland and Western 22.16
UK Devon 21.61
UK North Eastern Scotland 21.61
PL Małopolskie 21.30
PL Śląskie 20.99
UK North Yorkshire 20.51
UK
Northumberland and Tyne 
and Wear 20.23
Convergence Transition RCE
Population aged 30-34 with tertiary education in % 23.5 31.9 35.4
Change in the population 30-34 with tertiary education,
2000 - 2008
in pp points 9 7.6 9.5
Distance to Europe 2020
in pp points 16.5 8.1 4.6


















Employment rate, 20-64, in 2008 and distance to Europe 2020 target
Distance to the Europe 2020 target
(thousands of employed)








Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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Employment rate
% of population aged 20-6433
Employment rate and the Europe 2020 strategy
The employment rate is the number of employed relative to the population aged 20-64.
Why does it matter?
The employment rate reª  ects the e˜   ciency on the labour market. Low employment rates mean unused potential in 
the region lowering its capacity to provide goods and services and leading to a much lower GDP per head than the 
potential one. Similarly, increases in employment can lead to higher GDP per head. The employment is positively associ-
ated with people’s well-being. Hence, increasing employment rates would increase not only GDP per head but also the 
citizens’ overall life satisfaction. The Europe 2020 strategy has set the target for the employment rate in the EU at 75%.
How do the EU regions score?
Most of the Convergence regions are in a phase of restruc-
turing with falling employment in less productive sectors 
which is not always compensated with increases in most 
productive sectors.  As a result, Convergence regions have 
generally  lower  employment  rates  and  lower  increases 
in employment rates than the more developed regions. 
Employment rates in the Nordic countries, the UK and the 
Netherlands are already in most regions above the 75% 
target. On the other hand, in Southern Spain, Southern 
Italy, Greece and many of the regions in the EU-12 rates 
are considerably below the target. Increasing the employ-
ment rates in these regions would make a very signiž  cant 
contribution to their economic growth. This would, how-
ever, require not only a reduction in unemployment but 
also many of the inactive to enter the labour market, par-
ticularly in the Convergence regions where labour partici-
pation tends to be lower. 
In particular, in regions with low 
employment  rates,  the  impact 
of employment growth on eco-
nomic  growth  would  be  even 
higher  if  accompanied  by  an 
increase  in  the  education  lev-
els. This way, the regions would 
make sure that they create the 
kinds of jobs that raise produc-
tivity and living standards.
Convergence Transition RCE
Employment rate % 64.9 67.5 73.7
Change in employment rate 2000 - 2008 in pp points 3.2 5.4 4.2
Distance to reach the Europe 2020 target
in pp points 10.1 7.5 1.3
in thousand persons 9 690 1 732 4 620
Country Top Ten regions Employment 
rate %
This table shows the ten regions with the 
highest employment rate (age 20-64) in 2008
SE Stockholm 83.2
SE Småland med öarna 82.9
UK Berkshire, Buckinghamshire 
and Oxfordshire 82.1






UK Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and 
Bristol/Bath area 81.0
Country Bottom Ten Regions Employment rate % Distance to Europe 2020 
target (thousands of people)
This table shows the ten regions with the lowest employment rate (age 20-64) 
in 2008 and the distance to the target of Europe 2020
IT Sardegna 56.3 199
HU Dél-Dunántúl 55.6 115
HU Észak-Alföld 55.2 182
HU Észak-Magyarország 54.7 151
IT Basilicata 54.0 74
IT Puglia 50.7 602
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 48.6 13
IT Calabria 48.3 323
IT Sicilia 48.2 804




















% of population aged 18-24
Early school leavers aged 18-24 in 2007-2009 and distance to Europe 2020 target
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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The Europe 2020 target for early school
leavers aged 18-24 is 10%
EU-27 = 14.8
Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO35
Early school leavers and the Europe 2020 strategy
The share of early school leavers measures the number of people aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary educa-
tion and not in further education or training, divided by the total population aged 18-24. 
Why does this matter?
The reduction of school leavers and the in-
crease  of  educational  attainment  are  key 
targets of Europe 2020. These two can pro-
vide vital support to Europe’s employment 
and  growth  objectives.  Education  is  one 
of the most important factors of growth in 
productivity and it can also lead to increases 
in employment, personal income and ones’ 
overall life satisfaction.
The Europe 2020 target (10% or lower by 2020) has been reached in 73 NUTS 2 regions, around one in four, but it 
requires a substantial e›  ort in many regions of all objectives to achieve it. The current distance to the target is esti-
mated to be equal to more than 2 million people. Transition regions have the highest share of early school leavers 
(20.1%). RCE regions perform better with 14.2%, but given their high population share, their absolute distance to the 
target is estimated to be rather high (more than 1 million people, half of the total).
How do the EU regions score?
Regional di›  erences in early school leavers 
are high. Regions of Portugal and Spain, as 
well as Malta, are the areas with the highest 
shares. Overall, 17 regions in Spain and Por-
tugal are over 30%. Other regions with shares 
over 20% can be found in Greece, Italy, Unit-
ed Kingdom, Romania and Bulgaria.
The regions with the highest total distance 
to the target are Andalucía, Cataluña and 
Comunidad  Valenciana  in  Spain,  Norte  in 
Portugal  and  Campania  in  Italy.  The  dis-
tance  to  the  target  in  three  Convergence 
regions  (Andalucía,  Norte  and  Campania) 
represents more than a half of the total dis-
tance estimated in all Convergence regions.
In  contrast,  the  regions  with  the  lowest  share  of  early 
school  leavers  are  located  in  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia 
and Poland. Other regions with low shares (below 5%) are 
located in France and Slovenia.
Country Top Ten Regions






This table shows the ten regions with the highest share of early school leavers 
aged 18-24 in 2007-2009 and their distance to the Europe 2020 target
PT Região Autónoma dos Açores 50.3 10.7
PT Região Autónoma da Madeira 44.9 8.8
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 43.4 2.4
ES Illes Balears 42.4 28.1
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla 41.7 1.9
ES Región de Murcia 39.3 37.3
PT Norte 38.8 95.6
MT Malta 38.0 11.3
ES Andalucía 37.8 205.7
ES Castilla-La Mancha 36.6 45.3
Country Bottom Ten Regions
% of early school 
leavers
This table shows the ten regions with the lowest share 




CZ Střední Morava 3.9




SK Bratislavský kraj 2.8
CZ Praha 2.6
Convergence Transition RCE
Early school leavers 
(age 18-24), %
14.7 20.1 14.2
Distance to Europe 2020 
target (thousands pers)
687 297 1 058















% of regional GDP
Total expenditure on R&D, 2007
EU-27 = 1.85
EL, IT: 2005; FR: 2004; NL: 2003
The Europe 2020 R&D target is 3%
Source: Eurostat
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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General expenditure on R&D (GERD)
This indicator measures the share of regional GDP invested in expenditure on research and development by both 
the private and the public sector.
Why does this matter?
GERD indicates the resources devoted by a region for the development of innovations and the transformation of 
new ideas into market opportunities through R&D. In general, the majority of activities related to R&D take place 
within the private sector but the public sector also plays a crucial role notably by supporting fundamental research. 
The Europe 2020 strategy includes the headline target of bringing GERD to 3% of GDP for the EU-27 by 2020.
How do the EU regions score?
Scores on this dimension vary widely across EU regions. 
GERD is highly concentrated from a geographical point of 
view. Ten regions account for 16% of this type of expendi-
ture in the EU.
Regions with the highest GERD to GDP ratio are mostly lo-
cated in Northern Europe, notably in Germany, the Nordic 
MS and the UK, with GERD exceeding 3% of GDP. At the 
other end of the spectrum, a series of regions mainly in 
Bulgaria, Greece, Poland and Romania have expenditure 
on research and development below 0.5% of their GDP. In 
some regions, like for instance Severen Tsentralen in Bul-
garia or Lubuskie in Poland, this share is almost zero. 
In general, RCE regions have much higher GERD to 
GDP ratio than Transition and Convergence regions. 
On average, the share of regional GDP spent of GERD 
is around 2% in RCE regions while it is less than 1% in 
Transition and Convergence regions.
Country Top Ten Regions GERD in % GDP
The ten regions with the highest total intramural expenditure 
on R&D as a % of GDP in 2007
DE Braunschweig 6.77
DE Stuttgart 5.84








BE NUTS 1, DK national, no data for FR9 (=DOM) and BG31
Country Bottom Ten Regions GERD as % of GDP
The ten regions with the lowest total intramural expenditure 
on R&D as a % of GDP in 2007
EL Ionia Nisia  0.16
BG Severozapaden 0.15
RO Centru 0.15
EL Notio Aigaio  0.14
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 0.14
PL Opolskie 0.14
PL Świętokrzyskie 0.12
EL Dytiki Makedonia  0.12
PL Lubuskie 0.09
BG Severen tsentralen 0.08
Convergence Transition RCE
GERD in % GDP 0.77 0.98 2.03
Distance to EU 2020 target 


















Index - Values range between 0 (low) and 100 (high)
Competitiveness Index, 2010
EU-27 = 55
Source: JRC and DG REGIO




This measures the institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a region and the 
region’s ability to o›  er high and rising incomes and a good quality of life to its residents. This index is based on 69 
indicators. It ranges from 100 high to 0 low in the EU.
Why does this matter?
The economic crisis has highlighted that in many coun-
tries the sources of growth were not su˜   ciently robust. 
This underlines the need for better measures of economic 
performance that incorporate the critical elements of sus-
tainable economic growth. Furthermore this indicator in-
corporates several indicators of well-being as well such as 
life expectancy, health perception and gender equality. For this reason, the best way to improve competitiveness of 
more developed regions is not the same as the best way to make less developed regions catch up; this index takes 
into account the level of development of a region. It places more weight on basic issues such as institutions, primary 
and secondary education, and basic infrastructure. Only in the most developed regions is the emphasis on innova-
tion aspects such as business sophistication and technological readiness.
How do the EU regions score?
The top ten regions are all located in Nordic and West-
ern  Member  States.  Six  out  of  the  ten  are  capital  city 
regions.  There  are  signiž  cant  di›  erences  within  coun-
tries, notably in Belgium and Italy and in several of the 
EU-12 countries. This highlights that a national competi-
tiveness index cannot capture the internal diversity, where 
some regions are much more and others less competitive.
The least competitive regions are located in south-eastern 
regions without a large city. They also include some of the 
outermost regions.
While in the EU-15, a competitive region tends to be 
surrounded by other competitive regions, in the EU-12 
the most competitive region tends to be surrounded 
by regions with a much lower level of competitiveness. 
This implies that the spill-overs of growth and the dis-
persion of competitiveness are still in their infancy in 
these countries.
Country Top Ten Regions Competitiveness 
Index









FR Île de France 92.1
NL Noord-Brabant 91.4
UK
Berkshire, Bucks and 
Oxfordshire 90.1
Country Bottom Ten Regions
Competitiveness 
Index
This table shows the ten regions with 
the lowest competitiveness index
RO Sud-Vest Oltenia 12.7
EL Notio Aigaio 12.5
RO Sud-Est 12.2
BG Severozapaden 12.1
EL Ionia Nisia 9.5
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 8.9
PT Região Autónoma dos Açores 8.8
EL Voreio Aigaio 8.0






























This measures the number of people aged 15 and more who are without work but looking for work and available 
for work, divided by the number of people aged 15 and more and active in the labour market, i.e. those working or 
looking for work.
Why does this matter?
High unemployment is a threat to social cohesion leading to poverty and social exclusion and it is one of the most 
important incentives for people to leave their regions.
The  rapid  reduction  of  unemployment  rates  in 
the Convergence regions between 2000 and 2008 
reduced the gap between Convergence and the 
RCE regions by more than half. In 2000, the rate in 
Convergence regions was double that in RCE re-
gions. Convergence regions are faced mainly with 
structural unemployment due to a skills mismatch; 
which is often caused by rapid restructuring. Convergence regions tend to have low rates of participation. This 
means that as employment rates increase, people who were not working or looking for work may start to look for 
work, and thus partially o›  set the decline in the unemployment rate.
How do the EU regions score?
Regional disparities among the EU-27 regions remain high. 
The  French  overseas  departments  and  most  Southern  re-
gions in Spain have the highest unemployment rates, partly 
due to the e›  ect of the crisis on the labour market and also 
to the distance to the rest of the Union. The unemployment 
rate is high in Brussels too, a capital region with signiž  cant 
problems of social exclusion. 
The other regions with rates over 10% can be found mainly in 
the Eastern regions of Spain, the South of Belgium, Southern 
Italy, Eastern Hungary and the East German Länder. In con-
trast, most Dutch regions, Praha and some regions in Austria 
and Northern Italy have rates of 3% or lower. 
The ten top movers had an unemployment rate 
of more than 20% in 2000 and less than 8% in 
2008. Regional unemployment disparities in 2008 
were lower than in 2000, which means that the 
di›  erence between the regions with high and low 
unemployment rates has been narrowed.
Unemployment  rates  dropped  signiž  cantly  in 
some Polish regions, the North of Bulgaria, Corse 
in France and Calabria in South Italy. On the other 
side,  all  continental  regions  of  Portugal  except 
Lisbon, Eastern Hungary and some regions in the 
South  of  Spain  witnessed  a  substantial  increase 
in  their  unemployment  rates.  Since  2008,  how-
ever, unemployment rates in some regions have 
changed dramatically, in particular in Ireland, the 
Baltic States and Spain.
Convergence Transition RCE
Unemployment rate 2008 8.6 9.5 6
Change in unemployment rate 
2000-2008
-5.3 -1.9 -0.7
Country Top Ten Regions  Unemployment 
rate, %
This table shows the ten regions with the highest rate of 





ES Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla 20.7
ES Andalucía 17.8
ES Canarias 17.4
ES Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 17.3
BE




Country Top Ten Movers Change in unemployment rate, 
percentage points
This table shows the ten regions in which the unemployment rate 









BG Severen tsentralen -12.1
















% of total population
Population at-risk-of-poverty after social transfers, 2008
EU-27 = 17
At-risk-of-poverty is defined as having equivalised disposable income (i.e. adjusted for household size and 
composition) of less than 60% of national median.
The Europe 2020 target is to lift at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion.
This is defined as people who are either at-risk-of-poverty and/or severely materially deprived
and/or living in households with very low work intensity.
Source: DE - 2008 - data Microcensus - DESTATIS; FR - 2007 data; 
PT - based on HBS 2005; NL CBS - 2007;  
UK - Households Below Average Income - 2007/09; All other data EU-SILC;
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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Share of population with an at-risk-of-poverty income
This measures the share of the population with a disposable income (after social transfers) below the at-risk-of-
poverty threshold (which is set at 60% of the national median disposable income).
Why does this matter?
The share of the population with an at-risk-of-pov-
erty income reª  ects both the incidence of relative 
poverty and the extent of income disparities and 
hence social cohesion. Fighting against poverty is 
a key objective of the Europe 2020 strategy. The 
target is to reduce the number of Europeans living in poverty or exclusion by 20 million people. Regions charac-
terized by a high share of the population at-risk-of-poverty are areas where problems linked to low income, social 
exclusion and material deprivation are likely to be more severe.
How do the EU regions score?
EU regions show wide variation in their share of the 
population at-risk-of-poverty. Regions like Ceuta, 
Extremadura in Spain or Campania in Italy have 
around 40% of their population at-risk-of-poverty. 
At the other end of the spectrum, this share is only 
4.9% for Trento in Italy and 5.8% for Jihozápad in 
the Czech Republic.
Regions with high shares of population at-risk-of-
poverty are mainly found in the South of Europe 
(Southern Spain and Italy, Greece) and in Eastern 
Europe (Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, Romania). Some 
regions  in  Germany  (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
and  Sachsen-Anhalt)  or  in  the  United  Kingdom 
(West Wales and The Valleys and Northumberland 
and Tyne and Wear) also record particularly high 
shares of population at-risk-of-poverty. Low rates 
are observed in regions of Austria, France, North-
ern Italy, the Czech Republic or Slovakia.
On  average,  Convergence  and  Transition  regions  have 
higher  shares  of  population  at-risk-of-poverty  than  RCE 
regions.
Country Top Ten Regions
Population at-risk-of-
poverty %
This table shows the ten regions with the highest share of the 
population with an at-risk-of-poverty income in 2008










Country Bottom Ten Regions
Population at-risk-
of-poverty %
This table shows the ten regions with the lowest share of the 
population with an at-risk-of-poverty income in 2008
AT Salzburg 7.8
CZ Střední Čechy 7.4





ES Comunidad Foral de Navarra 6.5
RO Bucureşti - Ilfov 6.5
CZ Praha 6.1
CZ Jihozápad 5.8
IT Provincia Autonoma Trento 4.9
Convergence Transition RCE






















Treatment capacity as % of generated load
 Urban waste water treatment capacity, 2007
Source: DG ENV, REGIO-GIS
Based on UWWT data available in November 2009
© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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Urban waste water treatment capacity
It measures the treatment capacity of urban waste water in a region compared to the total load generated. 100 
means therefore that there is capacity to treat all urban waste water generated. Urban waste water means waste wa-
ter from residential settlements and services which originates predominantly from the human metabolism and from 
household activities (domestic waste water) or a mixture of domestic water with waste water which is discharged 
from premises used for carrying on any trade or industry (industrial waste water) and/or run-o›   rain water.
Why does this matter?
Urban waste water is one of the most serious causes of water pollution. The European Union adopted in 1991 a 
Directive1 which concerns the collection, treatment and discharge of urban waste water and the treatment and 
discharge of waste water from certain industrial sectors. Member States are asked to enact the dispositions of this 
Directive in their national legislation. The aim of this Directive is to protect the environment and human health from 
any adverse e›  ects due to discharge of such waters and can be considered as an indicator of how Member States 
are achieving European objectives in these areas. 
How do the EU regions score?
Full treatment capacity was observed in 2007 in all regions of the Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and France 
(except Guyane). There was also very high treatment capacity in the regions of Germany (only some regions in the 
East were not enjoying full capacity though over 90% in all cases), Austria (at least 97% in all regions) and Slovakia 
(full capacity in all regions except the capital region, Bratislava, which was at 91%). 
Member States which joined the EU in 2004 or afterwards were given a transitional period until 2010 or later for com-
pliance with the Directive This explains to some extent why Malta, ž  ve Romanian regions and a Bulgarian region are 
among the ten bottom regions in terms of treatment capacity. However, two Belgian regions (including Brussels, the 
capital region) and the outermost French region of Guyane are also in this group. Treatment capacity was also poor 
(lower than 85%) in most Hungarian regions, in the capital regions of Estonia, Ireland, Hungary and Poland and in a 
number of regions which are important touristic destinations such as Açores, Canarias, Algarve or Veneto which hosts 
the city of Venezia. These ž  gures may suggest a challenge in these kinds of regions where urban waste water goes far 
beyond what could be expected just from their number of inhabitants due to commuting and touristic ª  ows.
1 Council Directive 91/271/EC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste treatment which was amended by Directive 98/15/EC of 27 March 1998.
Country Bottom Ten Regions Treatment 
capacity %
This table shows the ten regions with the lowest treatment capacity as a % 
of the generated load in 2007
RO Sud - Muntenia 43
BE Prov. Namur 29
RO Vest 24
RO Centru 22
BE Région de Bruxelles-Capitale / Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest 22
MT Malta 21
RO Sud-Vest Oltenia 15
BG Severen tsentralen 8
FR Guyane 2





















Estimated public investment per head (PPS), average 2002-2006
CZ 2005/06, PL and PT 2002/05
Source: NSO, DG REGIO




Public investment is dež  ned here as the sum of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (P51 in the European System of Ac-
counts- ESA-95) and consolidated Capital Transfers (D9_CO) of the General Government, after netting out transfers 
between the di›  erent levels of Government. It is expressed in yearly terms and in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) 
in order to take account of the di›  erences in price levels across Member States.
Why does this matter?
Public investment is a critical factor for competitiveness of regions. It tends to increase the rate of return on private 
capital and, in the medium and long run, boosts economic growth. Public investment is particularly relevant to 
tackle structural weaknesses of many regions which hamper for instance developing business, strengthening their 
export capacity or attracting private investment.
How do the EU regions score?
Transition regions have enjoyed by far the highest rates of public 
investment  over  the  period  2002-2006.  These  are  in  general 
relatively less developed regions of countries which were already 
members of the EU before 2004. The main reason for these high 
rates is that many of these regions were fully eligible for Objective 
1 of EU Cohesion Policy in the period 2000-2006, that they belong 
to relatively prosperous Member States and even in some cases 
that  they  were  benež  ting  from  special  attention  by  national 
development policies. By contrast, many Convergence regions 
were part of countries with low capacity for public investment 
due to their low levels of GDP per head and, moreover, they were 
not eligible for EU Cohesion Policy as accession of most of these 
countries to the EU took place in May 2004.
The highest rates of public investment over the period 2002-
2006 (over EUR 3 000) were observed in the three mountainous 
and buoyant regions of North Italy and in Luxembourg. The oth-
er top ten regions are three island regions, the capital region of 
the Czech Republic and two low-density populated regions in 
Spain. Relatively high levels of GDP compared to the EU average 
and special geographical features seem the main explanatory 
factors determining the size of public investment in regions.
The  other  regions  with  rates  of  public  investment  per  head 
higher than EUR 1 250 can be mostly found in Spain, Eastern 
Germany, the South of Italy, the outermost regions of France 
and Greece. The European Cohesion Policy is a critical factor 
explaining their high scores as most of them were eligible for 
Objective 1 during the programming period 2000-2006.
In contrast, the lowest rates of public investment are found in most Polish regions and Latvia and Lithuania. The main 
factors behind this were their low levels of GDP per head compared to the EU average and that they were not eligible 
for the European Cohesion Policy during some part of the reference period. The gap between the top ten and bottom 
ten is nevertheless signiž  cantly narrowing over time thanks to higher rates of economic growth in most Eastern regions 
and to the support European Cohesion Policy provides them. 
Country Top Ten regions EUR per head
This table shows the ten regions with the highest yearly 
public expenditure per head in PPS in 2002-2006
IT Valle d'Aosta 4 263
IT P.A. Trento 3 616
LU Luxembourg 3 211
IT P.A. Bolzano 3 094
PT Madeira 2 422
FR Corse 2 170
CZ Praha 2 124
ES Castilla y León 1 807
ES Aragón 1 755
IT Sardegna 1 696
Country Bottom Ten Regions EUR per head
This table shows the ten regions with the lowest yearly 












Public investment per head in PPS 2002-2006 681 1 363 814K
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